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Cost-of-Living Adjustment Clauses 
in Union Contracts: A Summary 
of Results 
Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Cornell University and National 
Bureau of Economic Research 
Leif Danziger, Tel Aviv University 
Gee San, Cornell University 
Our paper provides an explanation why cost-of-living adjustment 
(COLA) provisions and their characteristics vary widely across U.S. 
industries. We develop models of optimal risk sharing between a 
firm and union to investigate the determinants of a number of con- 
tract characteristics. These include the presence and degree of wage 
indexing, the magnitude of deferred noncontingent wage increases, 
contract duration, and the trade-off between temporary layoffs and 
wage indexing. Preliminary empirical tests of some of the implica- 
tions of the model are described. One key finding is that the level 
of unemployment insurance benefits appears to influence the level 
of layoffs and the extent of COLA coverage simultaneously. 
I. Introduction 
Cost-of-living escalator clauses in union contracts tie, or index, work- 
ers' wages to some indicator of prices, such as the Consumer Price Index. 
The first major U.S. labor contract o contain such a clause was the 1948 
contract between General Motors and the United Automobile Workers 
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to David Card, Daniel Hamermesh, Wallace Hendricks, Dan Saks, a referee, and 
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(UAW).I Such provisions became prevalent during the inflation that ac- 
companied the Korean War, but interest in them waned as prices stabilized 
during the early 1950s. As a result, byJanuary 1955, only 23% of workers 
covered by major collective bargaining agreements-agreements that in- 
cluded 1,000 or more workers-were also covered by contracts that con- 
tained cost-of-living provisions. 
Prices rose during the late 1950s, and coverage expanded as large na- 
tional contracts in steel, aluminum and can, railroads, and electrical equip- 
ment incorporated such provisions. The relative price stability of the early 
1960s led to a reduction in coverage; indeed, the cost-of-living provision 
was dropped from the steel contract in 1962. Since 1966, however, high 
rates of inflation have been associated with steady increases in coverage: 
during the 1976-81 period roughly 60% of workers covered by major 
union contracts were also covered by cost-of-living provisions. 
The growth in the prevalence of cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) 
provisions has rekindled both academic and public interest in the topic, 
and this interest has taken a number of forms.2 First, attention has been 
directed towards the role of COLAs in the inflationary process. During 
the 1970s the wages of employees in heavily unionized industries who 
were covered by COLAs grew significantly relative to the wages of other 
employees in the economy (see, e.g., Kosters 1977; Mitchell 1980). In 
addition, the growing prevalence of multiyear contracts with COLA 
provisions has been shown to have reduced the responsiveness of the 
aggregate rate of wage inflation to the aggregate unemployment rate; 
increases in the rate of unemployment now "buy" less reduction in wage 
inflation than they did in the 1960s.3 Because of these facts, COLAs are 
thought by some to be one cause of the persistent high rates of inflation 
we have experienced in the United States-even though COLAs typically 
provide workers with much less than 100% protection against inflation.4 
Second, attention has been directed to the role COLAs may play in 
reducing the level of strike activity in the economy. One reason that a 
collective bargaining negotiation may not be settled before a strike is that 
the employer's and the union's forecasts and perceptions about future 
I See Douty (1975) for a more complete discussion of the history of cost-of- 
living clauses in union contracts in the United States. 
2 We say rekindled, since academic interest in the effect of indexation schemes, 
such as COLAs, on the economy goes back at least as far as Alfred Marshall 
(1886). 
3 On the growing insensitivity of the aggregate rate of wage inflation to un- 
employment, see Tobin (1980). On the insensitivity of deferred wage increases, 
including COLAs, in union contracts to unemployment, see Mitchell (1978). 
4For evidence on the "yield" from COLAs, see Shefer (1979). We will return 
to this point below. Farber (1981), Kahn (1981), Vroman (1982), and Hendricks 
and Kahn (1983), have presented evidence on the role of COLAs in the infla- 
tionary process. 
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rates of inflation may differ substantially. A COLA provision, which ties 
the wage over the course of a contract to future prices, reduces the need 
for the employer's and the union's price forecasts to coincide and thus 
may reduce the likelihood of a strike occurring.- Since strike activity 
involves lost output, COLAs may well have a positive effect on aggregate 
output. 
Third, numerous economists have focused on the implications of 
COLAs for macroeconomic stabilization policy.6 Among the questions 
they ask are, "Can indexing schemes protect the aggregate conomy from 
real or monetary shocks?" "How does the degree of indexing influence 
government stabilization policy?" and, "What is the optimal degree of 
indexing, from the perspective of macrostabilization or aggregate effi- 
ciency policy?" Their objective is to show that in a world of uncertain 
future outcomes, where it is impossible to establish contingent contracts 
that cover every possible state of the world, COLAs do lead to welfare 
gains. 
Finally, another stream of research has focused on the implications of 
COLAs for macroeconomic efficiency, in particular the sharing of risks 
of uncertain outcomes by firms and workers. These papers are in the 
tradition of the "implicit contract" literature, and they focus on optimal 
indexation from the perspective of a microlevel decision making unit.7 In 
particular, they examine the effects of such variables as the expected rate 
of inflation, uncertainty, employee risk aversion, the cost of indexing, 
and nonlabor income on the optimal degree of indexing. 
It is somewhat surprising that, although the latter two streams of lit- 
erature have focused on the determination of the optimal degree of in- 
dexing at the aggregate and micro levels, there have been only a few 
attempts to see if these theories can be used to explain either the varying 
prevalence of COLAs in the aggregate U.S. economy over time or why 
the prevalence of COLAs and their characteristics vary across industries 
at a point in time.8 Bureau of Labor Statistics data indicate quite clearly 
I For details of this argument and aggregate evidence that the presence of 
COLAs reduces strike activity, see Kaufman (1981). See also Mauro (1982) for 
a similar argument and empirical evidence using individual contract negotiation 
data. 
6 Important contributions here include Gray (1976, 1978), Barro (1977), Fisher 
(1977a, 1977b), and Blanchard (1979). 
7 The relevant papers here are Shavell (1976), Azariadis (1978), and Danziger 
(1980, 1983). 
8 See Estenson (1981), Kahn (1981), and Hendricks and Kahn (1983); these 
studies are primarily empirical in nature; they do not provide rigorous analytical 
models that permit them to identify all of the forces that influence COLAs. Our 
paper is more in the tradition of Card's (1981, 1982) work, although in some 
respects (noted below) our model is more general and his empirical analyses use 
Canadian contract data. 
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that the prevalence of COLAs in major collective bargaining agreements 
varies widely across industries (see, e.g., LeRoy 1981). Moreover, one 
cannot attribute these differences solely to differences in union strength; 
for example, a strong national union exists in bituminous coal mining 
and strong local unions exist in construction, but in neither industry are 
there many contracts with COLAs. 
Our paper seeks to provide an explanation why the prevalence and 
characteristics of COLA provisions vary widely across U.S. industries. 
We do this in the context of models of optimal risk sharing between a 
firm and a union that allow us to investigate the determinants of a number 
of characteristics of union contracts. In addition to the degree of wage 
indexing, we focus on the determinants of deferred nominal or real wage 
increases in multiperiod contracts that are not contingent on the realized 
price level, on the determinants of the duration of labor contracts, and 
on the interrelationship between contract duration and wage indexation. 
Moreover, to integrate our research more fully into the implicit contract 
literature, we investigate the influence of parameters of the unemployment 
insurance (UI) system on the extent of indexing and the level of temporary 
layoffs. After developing a series of theoretical models, we proceed to 
describe our attempts to test some of the hypotheses these models gen- 
erate, using individual contract data and pooled cross-section time-series 
data at the two-digit manufacturing industry level. 
In the main, this paper represents a summary and extension of research 
reported in a longer paper (Ehrenberg, Danziger, and San 1982). Space 
does not permit us to describe all of the details of our research or to 
provide proofs of propositions here. Interested readers should see the 
longer paper for details and derivations. 
II. A 1-Period Model with Fixed Employment 
Consider first the following simple 1-period model. A union and an 
employer must decide on the provisions of a collective bargaining agree- 
ment before the aggregate price level is known. At the time negotiations 
take place, the aggregate price level, p, is equal to unity, but during the 
period that the contract will cover the price level is uncertain; the expected 
value of p during the period is denoted byfp and its coefficient of variation 
by 4p > 0. We also treat the firm's production function, its demand curve, 
and the prices of its nonlabor inputs as being uncertain, in a manner to 
be specified below. 
In principle, an optimal risk-sharing arrangement would make both 
the wage and the employment level contingent on the realized outcomes 
of the aggregate price level, the firm's productivity, its demand curve (as 
proxied perhaps by its output price level), and the price of its nonlabor 
inputs. For now, however, we assume that the employment level is pre- 
determined and equal to the number of union members, N. Thus there 
COLAs: A Summary 219 
is no temporary layoff unemployment in this model (we will relax this 
assumption in Sec. VI below). 
In addition, we assume that when the employer and the union negotiate 
a wage schedule w, this wage is contingent on, or indexed only to the 
aggregate price level 
w = w(p). (1) 
Virtually all contracts with COLAs in the United States are structured 
in this manner and only rarely are wages explicitly tied to future pro- 
ductivity, industry price levels, or input price levels.9 Our failure to 
observe more contracts that also tie wages to these variables undoubtedly 
reflects factors such as moral hazard (firms may have some control over 
their output prices) and the costs of obtaining information and enforcing 
such contracts (the difficulties involved in measuring productivity and 
demand shifts, etc.).10 
Suppose that workers are risk averse and have cardinal utility functions 
of the form U[(w/p) + M], with U' > 0 and U" < 0. Utility depends 
on the worker's real income in a period, with M being the level of real 
nonwage labor income. For now we treat M as being identically equal 
to zero; later we will indicate how the extent that it varies with the price 
level effects the optimal degree of indexing of wages. 
The firm uses labor (L) and a composite variable input (X) to produce 
output (Q) via the production function relationship: 
Q = f(L, X, e1) . (2) 
Here e1 is a random productivity shock whose realized value becomes 
known only after the contract is signed. That is, productivity is uncertain 
at the time of the negotiations. For simplicity, we assume that e1 is 
independent of both the distribution and realization of the aggregate price 
level. 
Demand for the firm's output is assumed to depend both on the price 
charged by the firm and on the amount of unanticipated inflation, with 
the latter defined by 
fi = p/. (3) 
9 There are, of course, exceptions to this statement. The "ton tax" method of 
financing fringe benefits that prevailed for many years in the bituminous coal 
industry is an example of a contract where compensation is contingent upon 
productivity; as is well known, this scheme was designed to reduce employers' 
incentives to substitute capital for labor. Similarly, the recent UAW contract with 
Chrysler and the airline contracts with Eastern Airlines, that tie compensation 
to profits, implicitly are contingent on all uncertain events. 
10 For more on this point, see the discussion between Barro (1977) and Fisher 
(1 977a). 
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The notion is that unanticipated inflation in the aggregate price level may 
lead to increases in the demand for some firms' products and decreases 
in the demand for others."I 
Specifically, we assume that the inverse demand function can be written 
q = pg(Q, fie2) 1 (4) 
where q is the price of the firm's product, e2 is a random demand shock 
whose realization becomes known only after negotiations are concluded, 
and the inclusion of Q allows the firm to face a downward-sloping demand 
curve. The demand shock is assumed to be independent of the distribution 
of the aggregate price level and, accordingly, we assume that the real 
price (q/p) the firm can charge for its product at any specified output 
level is independent of the expected inflation rate. 
The price of the variable input X is also assumed to depend on the 
amount of anticipated inflation and is given by 
z = ph(fi, e3) , (5) 
where z is the price of the input and e3 is a random cost shock. As with 
the other shocks, the realized value of e3 becomes known only after the 
negotiations are completed and e3 is assumed to be independent of the 
distribution of the aggregate price level (although it need not be inde- 
pendent of e, and e2). The firm is assumed, in (5), to be a price taker in 
the market for the other input for expositional convenience only. 
Because employment (L) is always equal initially to the number of 
union members, the firm's profit (IT) is given by 
T = pg[f(N, X, e,), fi, e27If(N, X, el) - ph(fi, e3)X - wN (6) 
The variable input X is chosen after the realized values of all of the random 
variables are known and, conditional on them, X is always chosen by 
the firm to maximize profits. Assuming an interior solution always exists, 
this requires that 
air/dX = 0 Vp and e, (7) 
where e = (el, e2, e3). 
The firm's utility from real profits is given by V(IT/p), where V is a 
cardinal utility function, V' > 0, and V' < 0( = 0) if the firm is risk averse 
(risk neutral). Given a wage schedule w(p), the firm's expected utility 
11 The key role of unanticipated inflation in the indexing decision has been 
previously noted by Card (1981). 
COLAs: A Summary 221 
obviously depends on the distributions ofall of the random variables in 
the model. 
The goal of the union is to maximize the representative worker's ex- 
pected utility, while the goal of the firm is to maximize its expected 
utility. It is beyond the scope of this paper to model the bargaining process 
and show how it may lead to an agreed upon contract.12 The only as- 
sumption that we make here is that the parties will reach a contract hat 
provides for efficient sharing of all risks stemming from unanticipated 
inflation. Such contracts can be obtained by choosing a wage indexing 
schedule that maximizes 
? = E[U(w/p)] + X E [V(-r/p)] (8) 
p p,e 
where X is a parameter that indicates the "share of the pie" that the 
employer eceives. Other things equal, higher values of X reflect greater 
employer bargaining power. 
It is useful to define the following functions: 
dw p the elasticity of the wage rate, w, with respect o the 
dp w aggregate price level, p; 
g p^ the elasticity of the firm's demand curve, g, with respect 
afi g to unanticipated inflation, fi; 
b ab fi the elasticity of other input prices, h, with respect to 
8p h unanticipated inflation, fi; 
dQ g the (absolute value) of the elasticity of demand with re- 
ag Q spect to the firm's real price, q/p; 
; -1 - -1 the elasticity of total revenue with respect o the firm's 
output, Q; 
af X the elasticity of output with respect o the other input, 
aX f X; 
A a - b~]4 the elasticity of the firm's real value added with respect 1 - rR to the aggregate price level, p; and 
W S the workers' relative risk aversion. 
In general each of these variables is a function and not a parameter. In 
what follows when we talk about a change in any one of them we mean 
a shift in the whole function. 
The elasticity of the wage rate with respect o the aggregate price level, 
E, is a measure of the extent o which the wage rate is indexed to the 
12 See Svejnar (1982) for an attempt o accomplish this objective. 
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price level. It is straightforward to show (see Ehrenberg, Danziger, and 
San 1982, app. A) that maximization of (8) subject to (1)-(7) yields that 
the optimal degree of indexing is given by 
EV'A (IT + wN/p) 
E = 1- e 9 
SEV - (wN/p) EV e e 
That is, the optimal degree of wage indexing depends both on factors 
exogenous to the bargaining process (such as the extent of employer and 
employee risk aversion) and on the outcome of the bargaining process 
itself (such as the level of wages) and hence the parties' relative bargaining 
power. 
Note that if the firm is risk neutral (V" = 0), indexing is complete 
(E = 1). In this case, the real wage is independent of the aggregate price 
level and the firm fully insulates workers against inflation risks. Since 
collective bargaining agreements seldom call for complete indexing, 
throughout he rest of the paper we assume that the firm is risk averse. 
It is apparent from (9) that the elasticity of the firm's real value added 
with respect to the aggregate price level, A, is a key variable in determining 
the extent of indexation. If A is greater (less) than zero, so that increases 
in the aggregate price level increase (decrease) the firm's real value added, 
then the firm shares the rewards (costs) of inflation by providing workers 
with a more than (less than) complete indexing. That is, indexing is not 
necessarily less than full; optimal risk-sharing agreements may call for 
workers to be "overcompensated" for inflation. Of course, if inflation 
is neutral in the sense that the firm's demand and the price of nonlabor 
inputs are unaffected by unanticipated inflation (a = b = 0 for all e), 
then E = 1. In this special case inflation risk affects the firm only through 
its effect on real wages, and full indexing eliminates all inflation risk for 
both workers and firm. The firm is still exposed to other risks (e), but 
since these are not related to inflation they cannot be alleviated by indexing 
to the aggregate price level. 
The first column in table 1 summarizes the main comparative static 
results that follow from equation (9); how changes in various factors 
influence the optimal degree of indexing. An increase in the elasticity of 
the demand curve with respect to unanticipated inflation (a) increases the 
degree of indexing since the larger the increase in real value added that 
results from an unanticipated increase in prices, the larger the pie available 
to share with workers. Conversely, the larger the elasticity of other input 
prices with respect to unanticipated inflation (b), the more disadvanta- 
geous is the unanticipated inflation to the firm, and therefore the smaller 
the degree of wage indexing that occurs. 
The effect of the elasticity of the firm's demand curve with respect to 
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its real price, Aq, depends upon the relationship of a and b. To see this, 
consider first he special case where these two elasticities are equal (a = b). 
In this case, unanticipated inflation causes identical percentage changes 
in the real marginal revenue product of nonlabor inputs (MRP) and in 
the inputs' real price. Since the input level, X, is always chosen so that 
its real marginal revenue product equals its real price (eq. [7]), there will 
be no adjustment in the amount of the input used and hence in output. 
In terms of figure la the firm will move from M to N. Consequently, 
the value of Xq does not affect he change in real value added in this case 
and E will be independent of Aq. 
In contrast, if a is greater than b, a higher unanticipated inflation implies 
a higher percentage increase in MRP than in z. In order to maintain the 
equality between the variable input's marginal revenue product and its 
price, the amount of the input and hence output must be higher. The 
magnitude of this effect will be larger the higher the elasticity of the 
marginal revenue product curve with respect to the input. This is illus- 
trated in figure lb where we assume that a is greater than b. The firm 
will move from M to 0 with a less elastic demand curve and from M to 
P with a more elastic one. The latter case is associated with a greater 
increase in real value added and thus we should observe a higher degree 
of indexing associated with it. Since, other things equal, higher values of 
the elasticity of the firm's demand curve with respect to its real price are 
Table 1 
Summary of Main Results: 
1-Period Fixed Employment Model 
Degree Probability of 
of Indexing Inde~xing 
Increase in Parameter (E) (B) 
Elasticity of demand curve with respect to + + 
unanticipated inflation (a) 
Elasticity of other input prices with 
respect to unanticipated inflation (b) 
Elasticity of firm demand with respect to + > + > 
realprice~~~~~~~q) ~0 as a -b 0 as a -b real price (-q) - < - < 
Elasticity of output with respect to other + > + > 
input (,3) O as a-b O as a-b input < ~ ~~~~~ < 
Employee risk aversion (S) O as A-0 + 
Expected inflation (p) 0 0 
Coefficient of variation in 0 + 
expected inflation (4+p) 
Costs of indexation (ci) 
Pure random variation in demand, _ < 
productivity, and other input prices 0 as A(S -R) - 0 + 
(4v)t + > 
The effect will depend on the distribution of the cost between workers and firm as well as on many 
parameters of the model. 
t See the text for the specific assumptions necessary to obtain these results. 
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associated with more elastic marginal revenue product curves for the 
variable input, higher elasticities of the demand curve will lead to higher 
values of wage indexing in this case. In contrast, if a is less than b, similar 
reasoning shows that increasing the elasticity of the firm's demand curve 
with respect to its own price will reduce the extent of indexing. 
The key point here, then, is that the firm's elasticity of demand with 
respect to its own real price (X) does affect he optimal degree of wage 
indexing, but that the direction of the effect depends upon the relationship 
of a and b, the elasticities of the firm's demand curve, and its other input 
prices with respect to unanticipated inflation. If a is greater (less) than b, 
higher values of Xq lead to more (less) wage indexing. Since a higher 
elasticity of output with respect to the variable input (X) is also associated 
with a higher elasticity of the variable input's MRP curve, analogous 
results follow with respect to this variable. That is, increases in 3 are 
associated with increases (decreases) in the extent of indexation if a is 
greater (less) than b. 
Several other results are easier to explain. First, the more risk averse 
workers are, the greater is the value to them of smoothing variations in 
the real wage. Consequently, increased risk aversion (S) is associated with 
values of E closer to unity. 13 
Second, the optimal degree of indexing is independent of both the 
expected level of inflation (p) and the uncertainty of inflation (4p). These 
results follow directly from the assumption that all real variables are 
unaffected by the distribution of p, as opposed to its realized value. 14 
MRP, z MRP, z 
MRP~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~R 
M M~~x 
X ~~~X rX 
a b 
FIGURE 1 
13 Hendricks and Kahn (1983) erroneously concluded that increased employee 
risk aversion always would lead to increased wage indexing. This is true only if 
the initial degree of indexing is less than unity. 
14 In a more general model in which the aggregate price shock has some joint 
distribution with the firm's demand shock and the input price shock, the result 
with respect to the coefficient of variation would fail to hold. In such a model, 
our parameters a and b would measure the derivatives of the conditional inferences 
of demand and input prices with respect to the aggregate price level. The change 
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Finally, the optimal degree of indexing depends also on the residual 
uncertainty in real value added-the uncertainty in real value added caused 
by shocks to productivity, demand, and other input prices. Unfortu- 
nately, its effect on the optimal degree of indexing depends on many 
parameters in the model and on how they change. If one further assumes, 
however, that a, b, rq, 13, A, and R (where R = -[ V'V'][Tr/p]) is the 
firm's relative risk aversion) are constant, it can be shown that 
klaIv> 0 as A(S - R) -, (10) 
where 4), the coefficient of variation of real value added, is used as a 
measure of the residual uncertainty in real value added. If employee 
relative risk aversion (S) is greater than employer relative risk aversion, 
this implies that increased residual uncertainty makes indexing less perfect 
(further from unity). 15 
Before concluding this section, two extensions of the model warrant a 
brief discussion. First, suppose that we relax the assumption that the 
employee's nonlabor income, M, is always zero. Assuming that the level 
of nonlabor income is positive, its effect on the optimal degree of wage 
indexing depends on how its varies with the price level. If the level of 
nonlabor income is fixed in nominal terms, then to stabilize the sum of 
real wages and real nonlabor income will require a greater degree of wage 
indexing than in the absence of the nonlabor income, assuming that in- 
dexing is positive. In contrast, if the nonlabor income is fixed in real 
terms (perfectly indexed), then any desired degree of real income stabi- 
lization (not equal to perfect stabilization) can be achieved with now less 
perfect wage indexing (E further from unity). 
Second, suppose we now allow wages to be indexed not only to the 
aggregate price level, but also to the shocks to the firm's productivity, 
demand curve, and input prices. In this case, one can show that if em- 
ployers are risk neutral then wages should be tied only to the aggregate 
price level (with E = 1) and not to the other forces. If firms are risk 
averse, in theory wages should be tied to all of the other forces. However, 
small values of the elasticity of the firm's total revenues with respect to 
in these conditional inferences for a given change in prices depends on the "in- 
formation content" of aggregate prices. Other things equal, the higher the coef- 
ficient of variation of aggregate price shocks, the lower is this information content 
and thus the closer would be the elasticity of indexing to unity. We are grateful 
to the referee for calling this point to our attention. 
15 See Ehrenberg et al. (1982, app. A). Note further that if A is also less than 
zero, so that indexing is less than complete, this implies that increased residual 
uncertainty reduces the extent of indexing. This apparently is a hypothesis that 
Estenson (1981) and Hendricks and Kahn (1983) sought to test. 
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its output (4I); of the elasticity of its output with respect to other inputs 
(13); and of the elasticities of output, demand, and input prices with respect 
to the random shocks will reduce the extent to which wages are tied to 
the other forces (see Ehrenberg et al. 1982, sec. 2). These factors, in 
addition to the ones we have described above, may explain why wages 
are typically not indexed to anything other than the aggregate price level. 
III. The Decision to Index 
As noted above, in recent years approximately 60% of all unionized 
workers covered by major collective bargaining agreements were also 
covered by COLA provisions. It would be only a coincidence if the 
optimal degree of wage indexation implied by (9) was zero for 40% of 
unionized employees. What factors are responsible then for such a large 
number of workers who have contracts that are not indexed at all? 
The answer hinges on the possibility that there may be fixed real costs 
per worker of negotiating or administrating indexing clauses that must 
be borne either by the union or the employer. These costs may arise from 
a number of factors. For example, if a contract is indexed, union leaders 
may not receive "credit" from their members for the periodic nominal 
wage increases that automatically arise due to inflation. As a result, to 
maintain their political positions in the union, union leaders may push 
during contract negotiations for additional periodic noncontingent money 
wage increases; this may make it more difficult o reach a contract set- 
tlement. 
To take another example, in a world of heterogeneous workers of 
differing skill levels, employers would like to have the flexibility to alter 
relative wages in response to external shortages or surpluses of workers 
in particular skill classes. Cost-of-living provisions, however, typically 
are specified as a given percentage increase in wages for each percentage 
increase in prices, or as a given absolute increase in wages for each per- 
centage-point increase in prices. The former scheme rigidly preserves 
relative wage rates, while the latter causes skill differentials to be com- 
pressed. In either case, the employer loses the ability to alter relative 
wages during the period covered by the contract, and this reduces his 
willingness to agree to COLA provisions. 
Suppose that we can represent these fixed real costs per worker of 
having an indexed contract by ci. Indexing, of course, yields risk-sharing 
benefits to both employer and employees. The monetary value of these 
benefits is the total amount in real terms that both parties would be willing 
to pay to have wages indexed. One can show that this real benefit per 
worker less the real cost per worker of having an indexed contract is 
approximately equal to 
B = lz ,E2(S - WE NEV'/EV') - ci, (11) 2 e e 
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where zD = w(f)/f, r = rr(ft)/, E is evaluated at P, S is evaluated at WE, 
and V' and V' are evaluated at -r (Ehrenberg et al. 1982, app. B). 
While in general one cannot observe the continuous variable B, one 
can observe whether a contract contains a COLA, and it is reasonable 
to postulate in empirical implementations that 
h = 1 if B + v>0 
(12) = 0 otherwise. 
Here B equals 1 if a contract has a COLA, zero otherwise; and v is a 
random variable that summarizes all other unobservable forces that may 
influence COLA coverage. 
From (11) and (12) it is straightforward to see how various forces 
influence the probability of a COLA's existing; these are summarized in 
table 1. First, note that a, b, q, and 13 influence B only through e; thus 
their effect on the probability of observing a COLA is the same as their 
effect on the degree of indexing, given that indexing occurs and is positive. 
Second, one can show that the more risk averse workers are the greater 
the gain from indexing to them and thus the more likely one will observe 
an indexed contract. Third, while the expected rate of inflation has no 
effect on the probability of indexing, given that workers are risk averse, 
the more uncertain inflation is the greater is the gain to them of indexing 
and thus the greater is the likelihood of indexing. Fourth, an increase in 
the costs of having an indexed contract obviously reduces the probability 
of having such a contract.16 Finally, if one additionally assumes that a, 
b, a, 1, A, R, and S are constants and that the extent of employer risk 
aversion just equals that of employee risk aversion (R = S), then an 
increase in residual uncertainty increases the probability of observing 
indexed contracts. 
In the main, then, the same variables that affect he degree of indexing, 
if it occurs, also influence the probability of indexing. However, as table 
1 indicates, in several cases the effect of a variable on the former may be 
different from its effect on the latter, and one variable, the coefficient of 
variation of expected inflation, influences only the latter. 
IV. A 2-Period Model, Deferred Payments, and the Relationship 
between Contract Length and COLA Generosity 
The models discussed in the previous two sections are not structured 
in a way that enables us to address a number of issues. These include, 
What determines the length of collective bargaining agreements? How do 
16 The effect of these costs on the degree of indexing, if it occurs, is ambiguous 
and depends on the distribution of the costs between the workers and the firm, 
among other things. 
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COLA provisions vary with contract duration? What determines the size 
of deferred wage increases that are not contingent on the price level in 
multiperiod contracts? Is there a trade-off between deferred increases and 
COLA provisions? To answer these questions one must move to a mul- 
tiperiod model. We do so in this and the following section. 
We consider, for simplicity, a 2-period model in which neither firms 
nor workers can borrow or lend. Let a subscript 1 (2) denote period 1 
(2). Suppose first, that the workers' and the firm's utility functions both 
exhibit equal constant relative risk aversion (S) and can be written re- 
spectively as 
U = U(w1/p1) + pU(w2/p2), 
V = V(iTl/pl) + PV(T2/P2), (13) 
where p(>O) is a discount factor common to both workers and firms. 
Suppose, also, that the firm's production function can be written as a 
Cobb-Douglas function 
LXellX e = L2X te (14) 
Q 1 111 2 2 1 12' 
where t1 - 0 in period 2. Values of t1 greater than unity indicate positive 
expected rates of productivity growth in this formulation. 
Suppose next that the inverse demand functions and the input price 
functions are of constant-elasticity t pe and are given, respectively, by 
q = p ,e q2 = t21 (15) 
and 
Z= ,e3l Z2 = p2filbp2t3e32 e (16) 
Note that this specification allows both the demand function and input 
price schedules to change between periods and the effects of unanticipated 
inflation to persist over time, so that unanticipated inflation in period 1 
may affect he demand curve and other input prices in period 2. 
Specifically, here y(8) is the degree of serial correlation in the effect of 
unanticipated inflation on the demand function (input prices). If y(8) 
equals zero, unanticipated inflation in period 1 has no effect on the de- 
mand curve (input prices) in period 2. In contrast, if y(8) equals unity 
then unanticipated inflation in period 1 has the same effect on demand 
(input prices) in period 2 as does unanticipated inflation in period 2. The 
expected growth between periods in real demand is given, in the absence 
of any unanticipated inflation, by t2 and the expected growth in input 
prices is similarly given by t3. While the vector-of-error terms e1 = 
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(e1l, e21, e31) and e2 = (e12, e22, e32) are assumed to be independent of the 
realized values of Pi and p2, they are not required to be independent of 
each other. 
Finally, suppose that the wage that will prevail in the second period 
of the contract can be written as 
W2 = w1y(p), (17) 
where w1 is the wage that prevails ex post in period 1, p equal to P2/p1 is 
the actual relative increase in the price level in the second period, and 
y(fi) is the multiplier that translates the wage in period 1 into the wage 
in period 2. We assume that the realization of P is independent of the 
realization of pi and that its expected value (the expected inflation rate 
in period 2) isf, the same expected rate as in period 1. It is straightforward 
to see that the deferred wage change, as a percentage of the wage that 
prevails in period 1, is given by D - 1 where 
D = y(i) . (18) 
When D is greater than (less than) unity a deferred increase (decrease) is 
called for in the contract. 17 
As before, the firm will always choose the variable inputs in each period 
to maximize the profits in that period and, given that this is done, all 
contracts that optimally share inflation risks can be obtained by choosing 
indexing schemes w1(p1) and y(p) to maximize 
? = E U( ) + EPU ( ) 
Pl Pi P 1, P2 (19) 
+ AFLE V(IT) + P P 1(P)l 
-P 1,el Pi plopp ed P2 
It is tedious but straightforward to show that given the assumptions we 
have made, the magnitude of the deferred payment and the formulas for 
the optimal degree of wage indexing in the 2 periods are given by (Eh- 
renberg et al. 1982, sec. 4, app. C)18 
D = tP (20) 
17 Note that the definitions following eq. (18) require that the deferred increase 
be specified as a percentage of the wage that actually prevails in period 1. This 
assumption is made for analytic convenience; one could also specify the deferred 
increase as an absolute amount. 
18 The formula is more complex for p - in (21a). 
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E, = 1 + [(A + kA-)/(l + k)] for Pi = f (21a) 
E2= 1 + A, (21b) 
where 
A = ay - b6,4 
1 - +13 
is the now constant elasticity of the real value added in period 2 with 
respect to the increase in the aggregate price level in the previous period, 
t = (tt2t3 
is the expected growth in real value added when unanticipated inflation 
is zero in both periods, and 
k = pDl-SfA('-s) 
p 
is the common, for workers and the firm, ratio of the expected marginal 
utility in period 1 from an increase in the wage in period 1 to the expected 
marginal utility in period 2 of an increase in the wage in period 1, when 
the rate of inflation in period 1 equals its expected value. 
Equations (20) and (21a, b) immediately highlight a number of points. 
First, with the additional assumptions we have made in this section, the 
formula for the optimal degree of indexing in the 1-period model becomes 
identical to the formula for the optimal degree of indexing in the second 
period. 19 Second, the deferred increase D is proportional to the expected 
growth in real value added which the firm faces (t) when unanticipated 
inflation is zero in both periods. While the expected rate of productivity 
growth (t1) influences this variable, so does the expected growth in de- 
mand (t2) and the expected growth in other input prices (t3). Third, unless 
the elasticity of real value added with respect to the increase in the price 
level in the same period (A) is zero, the expected inflation rate influences 
the size of the deferred increase, with higher expected inflation rates 
leading to lower (higher) deferred increases if A is greater (less) than zero. 
Moreover, any parameter that influences A (a, b, a, 1) will have opposite 
effects on the size of the deferred increase and on the degree of wage 
indexing in the second period. There is, then, a trade-off between COLA 
provisions and deferred wage increases. 
What about the extent of wage indexing in the first period of the 
2-period contract? Is it larger or smaller than the extent of indexing that 
19 That is, eq. (9) would reduce to (21b). 
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would prevail in a 1-period contract, (1 + A)? Equation (21) makes clear 
that the degree of indexing is larger in the first period of the 2-period 
contract than it is in the 1-period contract (recall the latter equals the 
degree of indexing in the second period of the 2-period contract) only if 
A is less than A:-. The latter requires that ay - beef3 > a - buff. 
Is this likely to occur? While no general theoretical statements can be 
made, we can consider two special cases. First, suppose that b equals 
zero, so that unanticipated inflation does not influence input prices. If 
the degree of indexation in period 2 is less than complete (E2 < 1), which 
is typically the case, then A and hence a will be less than zero. In this 
case, the inequality will be satisfied as long as y < 1. That is, the extent 
of indexing will be greater during the first period of the 2-period model 
as long as the effect of unanticipated inflation on the firm's demand curve 
depreciates over time (-y < 1).20 
Second, suppose that b is not equal to zero but that the effect of 
unanticipated inflation on the demand and input price curves depreciates 
at the same rate (,y = 8). In this case, again as long as indexation is less 
than complete, so that A and a - be 3 are both less than zero, it follows 
that if By is less than unity the extent of indexation will again be greater 
during the first period of the 2-period contract. 
These special cases suggest that a reasonable hypothesis to test empir- 
ically is that as long as the observed extent of indexing is less than unity 
in the second period of a 2-period contract, the extent of indexing will 
be higher in the first period. Since the former equals the extent of indexing 
in the 1-period contract, on average the extent of indexing will be higher 
in the 2-period contract. Put more generally, one might expect to observe 
contracts of longer durations having more generous COLA provisions. 
Since the same factors that influence the generosity of a COLA also 
influence the probability of COLA coverage (see Sec. III), one should 
expect the incidence of COLAs to increase with contract length. In fact, 
this occurs.21 
V. The Optimum Duration of Labor Contracts 
In determining the optimal duration of a collective bargaining agree- 
ment, the parties to the agreement must consider the benefits and costs 
20 If a equals 0, and E2 < 1, one similarly can show that 8 < 1 is required to 
get the same result. 
21 For example, Douty (1981) reports that in 1975, 3.2% of all contracts with 
a duration of 1 year, 14.8% of all contracts with a duration of 2 years, and 50% 
of all contracts with a duration of 3 years contained a COLA (these figures refer 
to major collective bargaining agreements only). Note that it may also be rea- 
sonable to assume that the effect of within-period unanticipated inflation on 
demand and input prices is closer to zero in the second period than in the first. 
If this is the case, it provides another reason why the degree of indexing is closer 
to complete in long-term contracts. 
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of contracts of different lengths.22 For expository purposes we shall con- 
tinue to contrast 1- and 2-period contracts in the context of our simple 
model. 
Given the form of equation (17), which we believe to be a reasonable 
approximation to many actual contracts, there is inefficient risk sharing 
in the 2-period contract. Specifically, because inflation in the first period 
(Pi) can affect wages in the second period (w2) only through its effect on 
wages in the first period (w1), inflation risks are generally not shared 
efficiently inthe 2-period contract. A sequence of two 1-period contracts 
with equal degrees of wage indexing within each period can be shown to 
be preferable to the 2-period contract from a risk-sharing perspective. 
The sequence of two 1-period contracts has costs as well as benefits, 
however. These costs are of two types. First, there are costs to the em- 
ployer and the union of conducting collective bargaining negotiations. 
These are the explicit and implicit resource costs of the negotiations 
process including, but not limited to, the time diverted from production, 
contract administration, and planning activities. Although lost output 
due to strikes is an example of such costs, we emphasize that they may 
be substantial even in the absence of a strike or threat of strike. Multi- 
period contracts obviously reduce the frequency with which these costs 
are incurred. Second, since the two. 1-period contracts are negotiated 
sequentially, there is invariably some uncertainty, as of period one, about 
what the terms of the second contract will be, and this uncertainty will 
generate costs for the parties if they are risk averse. Multiperiod contracts 
reduce this form of uncertainty also. 
The choice of contract duration obviously involves a weighting of the 
loss from inefficient sharing of inflation risks, if a multiperiod contract 
is chosen, against the loss from additional bargaining costs and the un- 
certainty about the second-period contract, if two 1-period contracts are 
chosen. It is again straightforward to show that an increase either in the 
cost of collective bargaining or in the uncertainty in the first of two 1- 
period contracts, caused by not knowing what the wage bargain will be 
in the second period, will increase the probability of a 2-period contract. 
On the other hand, since the expected inflation rate (f) does not affect 
the expected utility from contracts of either length, it will not affect he 
choice of length. The serial correlation in the effects of unanticipated 
inflation on demand (-y) and other input prices (8) can also be shown to 
influence contract duration in a predictable manner that depends on the 
magnitudes of several other parameters in the model. Finally, while the 
remaining parameters in the model all influence the optimum duration 
22 See Ehrenberg et al. (1982), sec. 7, for a more extended discussion of the 
question of contract duration including the presentation of formal models. 
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of labor contracts, without further estrictive assumptions one cannot 
obtain unambiguous implications about their effects.23 
VI. Temporary Layoffs and COLA Coverage 
In the final theoretical section of our longer paper, we return to a 
1-period model with indexing of wages, but we allow employment o be 
variable across states of the world. This section stresses that temporary 
layoffs and the extent of indexing are simultaneously determined and 
highlights the role played by several parameters of the unemployment 
insurance (UI) system.24 To capture what we consider to be the essential 
features of the UI system, nominal UI benefits that laid-off unemployed 
workers receive are specified not to be contingent on the realized price 
level during the period, and employers' nominal unemployment insurance 
tax payments are specified to be imperfectly experience rated. As in the 
previous models, employers eek to maximize their expected utility from 
profits and the union seeks to maximize the expected utility of its rep- 
resentative member. The latter, in each state of the world, is now a 
weighted average of the worker's utility when he is employed and his 
utility when he is laid off, where the weights reflect he probability of 
being on layoff in the state of the world. 
In such a framework, contracts that provide for efficient sharing of 
inflation risk will require that both the wage rate and the employment 
level depend on the aggregate price level.25 Given the model of our longer 
paper, it is straightforward to derive employment (L[p]) and wage (w[p]) 
schedules and to see how they depend on parameters of the UI system 
(see Ehrenberg et al. [1982] for details). 
Our key results are, first, an increase in UI benefits or a decrease in 
the extent of experience rating will lead to increased layoffs in each state 
23 An alternative approach to the determination of optimal contract duration 
is found in Gray (1978). There, contract length is determined by the fact that the 
conditional inferences of the observed real variables, given aggregate prices, be- 
comes less and less precise as time goes on. At some point, in this framework, 
the cost of renegotiation is just equal to the expected benefit from being able to 
adjust wages back to their "full-information" levels. Because of our specification 
of the joint distribution of aggregate and relative price shocks (see n. 14), we have 
ignored this aspect of the contract length trade-off. 
24 Feldstein (1976) has stressed the effect of UI system parameters on temporary 
layoffs, but he does so in the context of a model in which both workers and firms 
are risk neutral, so that the degree of indexation is indeterminate. See also Baily 
(1977). 
25 As the referee has pointed out, it is hard to think of empirical analogues to 
the employment function our model produces that are explicitly contingent on 
the aggregate price level. Why we observe wage escalators but not employment 
escalators in actual labor contracts, is an open question. 
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of the world. Second, if indexing is less than complete (e < 1), an increase 
in experience rating will lead to an increase in the extent of wage indexing. 
Third, if indexing is less than complete and experience rating is "suffi- 
ciently imperfect," an increase in UI benefits will decrease the extent of 
wage indexing. Although we have not formally modeled the forces that 
influence the decision to have an indexed contract in this variable em- 
ployment model, our discussion in Section III suggests that the effects 
of the UI parameters on the probability of observing an indexed contract 
are likely to be of the same sign as their effects on the extent of indexing, 
given that indexing exists. 
VII. Empirical Analyses: Two-Digit Manufacturing Industry Data 
This section and the following one provide initial empirical tests of a 
few of the hypotheses generated by our models. Here, we use data at the 
two-digit manufacturing industry level and focus on the determinants 
both of the industry layoff rate and of the percentage of workers covered 
by major collective bargaining agreements who are also covered by a 
COLA provision. In the next, we use individual collective bargaining 
agreement data and analyze the determinants of COLA coverage, char- 
acteristics of COLAs (when they exist), and the duration of collective 
bargaining agreements. 
Our approach in this section is to estimate equations of the form 
13 4 3 
Fit= BlVit + E4klakit + FUIi + E D.1dit + Ulit (22) 
and 
13 4 3 
l Vjit + E 4k2akit + F2UI + E Dm2dit + U2it (23) 
k=i m=1 
Here Fit represents the fraction of the workers covered by major collective 
bargaining agreements in industry i in year t who are also covered by 
COLA provisions, and lit represents the 3-year average layoff rate in 
industry i in year t. The v's are variables that reflect personal character- 
istics of unionized workers in the industry and the industry bargaining 
structure, the a's are estimates of several demand-related variables (elas- 
ticity of industry demand with respect to unanticipated inflation [a1 = a], 
serial correlation in the effect of unanticipated inflation on industry de- 
mand [a2 = y], the expected growth of demand [a3 = t], and pure ran- 
dom variations in demand and productivity [a4 = 4<J), UI represents the 
average net unemployment insurance replacement rate in the industry- 
the average weekly UI benefits divided by the average weekly net (after 
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tax) loss of income incurred by laid-off unemployed workers in the in- 
dustry, the d's are industry and year dummy variables, the u's random 
variables, and 0, X, F, and D parameters to be estimated. A more complete 
description of the data, including its sources, is found in Ehrenberg et 
al. (1982, app. D), and a complete list of the explanatory variables is 
found here in table 2. 
Several comments should be made about this specification. First, we 
use data pooled across 3 years. Since many labor contracts are long-term, 
we do not use data for adjacent years, which would make it possible for 
the same contract o influence the industry "outcome" variables in more 
than one year. Rather, we use data for 1975, 1978, and 1981. 
Second, it is difficult o make unambiguous predictions about the ex- 
pected signs of many of the v variables, because they do not always 
correspond neatly in a one-to-one fashion with variables from the the- 
oretical models. For example, a bargaining structure variable, such as the 
number of unions in the industry, may serve as a proxy for the costs of 
having an indexed contract, the costs of concluding a collective bargaining 
agreement, and the share of the pie that the employer wins (A). Similarly, 
while personal characteristics of unionized workers may reflect employee 
relative risk aversion (S), some may also influence the costs of conducting 
negotiations, the costs of indexed contracts, and, indeed, employer and 
employee demands for long-term employment relationships. As such, we 
will not discuss these variables' coefficients below. 
Third, the estimated parameters of the demand function were obtained 
as follows. Using quarterly data on the Consumer Price Index (P,) from 
1970 to 1978, an expected CPI series (E[P(t)]) was generated using a 
fourth-order autoregressive model. For each two-digit manufacturing in- 
dustry, equations of the form 
log(S.t/P,) = h1l + h12log[P,/E(P,)] + h13T + u1l (24) 
and 
log(Sit/Pt) h2l + h22log[Pt/E(Pt)] (25) 
+ h23log(Sit 1/Pt-) + h24T + U2t 
were then estimated using quarterly data from 1971 to 1978, where Sit is 
the value of shipments in industry i in year t, T is a time-trend term that 
is incremented quarterly, and the u's are random error terms. When 
equation (24) is used, which allows for no serial correlation in the effects 
of unanticipated inflation on demand, al, a3, and a4 are estimated, re- 
spectively, by h12, h13, and &2{1 Similarly, when equation (25) is used, 
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which allows for serial correlation, one can show that al, a2, a3, and a4 
A A A A 
are given, respectively, by h22, h23, h24/(1 - h23), and (Tr2. 
Fourth, a key explanatory variable is the average unemployment in- 
surance net replacement rate (UI)-the average weekly UI benefits di- 
vided by the average weekly net (after tax) loss of income by laid-off 
unemployed workers in the industry. These data are obtained from a 
large scale microsimulation model of the unemployment insurance system 
built by the Urban Institute, and are based on data from the Survey of 
Income and Education.27 
Finally, dummy variables that indicate the year of the data and whether 
the industry is in durable manufacturing are also included in the model. 
The former are meant to control for variations in expected inflation and 
in the coefficient of variation of expected inflation over time. The latter 
is another proxy for negotiations costs, the elasticity of the firm's demand 
curve with respect to its own price, and the costs of indexed contracts. 
Estimates of variants of equations (24) and (25) are found in tables 2 
and 3; where the dependent variables are, respectively, the fraction of 
the workers under major collective bargaining agreements who are cov- 
ered by a COLA and the 3-year average of the industry layoff rate.28 
Quite strikingly, a number of key implications of the models are con- 
firmed. 
First, as suggested in Section VI, higher UI replacement rates in an 
industry are associated with a lower probability of observing an indexed 
contract and a higher level of industry layoffs. These results support the 
notion that cost of living indexing and the level of temporary layoffs are 
simultaneously determined.29 
26 Suppose that 
(SiIP,) = a, JJ[(Pt-i/E(Pt)lala2ea3teuit 
where a, represents the effect of unanticipated inflation on demand, a2 the serial 
correlation in the effects of unanticipated inflation and a3 the expected growth in 
demand. Taking logs of the equation, lagging it one period and multiplying the 
lagged equation by a2, and then subtracting this from the unlagged equation, the 
result in the text immediately follows. We should caution here that these param- 
eters may actually represent parameters of the real value-added function, not 
parameters of the demand curve. However, since the implications are essentially 
the same, for expository convenience we continue in the text to refer to them as 
parameters of the demand function. 
27 See Vroman (1980) for a description of the model and data. We are grateful 
to him for generously providing us with these data. 
28 Virtually identical results to those in table 2 were obtained when the fraction 
of agreements containing COLAs was used as a dependent variable. 
29 A referee suggested the possibility that UI replacement rates are negatively 
correlated with industry wage levels and hence the UI coefficient may simply 
indicate that COLAs are more frequent in higher wage industries. Inclusion of 
the industry wage as an additional explanatory variable, however, did not alter 
the sign or significance of the UI variables in tables 2 and 3. 
Table 2 
Determinants of Fraction of Workers Covered by a COLA, 
by Two-Digit Manufacturing: 1975, 1978, 1981 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
V1 - .117 - .054 - .056 - .039 .008 .014 .142 
(2.9) (1.8) (1.5) (1.2) (.1) (.3) (1.6) 
v2 -.008 -.002 -.017 -.007 -.012 -.007 -.009 
(1.5) (.4) (3.3) (1.4) (2.2) (1.6) (1.1) 
v3 .087 .040 .268 .141 .222 .133 .144 
(1.7) (.9) (4.7) (2.7) (3.6) (2.5) (1.8) 
v4 -.001 -.008 -.007 -.011 -.011 -.011 -.012 
(.1) (1.1) (.8) (1.5) (1.2) (1.5) (1.3) 
v5 .559 .769 .440 .696 .220 .540 .263 
(1.5) (2.9) (1.4) (2.6) (.7) (1.8) (.6) 
v6 4.315 5.123 .422 2.795 - .192 1.980 .290 
(2.9) (4.3) (.3) (2.0) (.1) (1.2) (.1) 
v7 .048 .114 .031 .098 .054 .100 .089 
(1.8) (4.5) (1.3) (3.9) (2.0) (4.0) (2.4) 
V8 - 6.357 - 4.325 - 6.127 -5.010 - 3.789 - 3.524 - 1.255 
(3.5) (3.1) (4.2) (3.7) (1.8) (1.9) (.5) 
V9 - 1.983 - 6.597 1.255 -4.914 1.522 - 3.432 - 2.162 
(1.1) (3.1) (.7) (2.3) (1.0) (1.4) (.7) 
V10 - .933 - .146 .152 .524 .653 .685 1.072 
(1.7) ( 4) (.3) (1.2) (1.1) (1.5) (1.9) 
V11 .185 .688 -4.176 -2.172 -3.053 - 1.634 - 1.365 
(.1) (.7) (3.2) (1.6) (2.1) (1.1) (.7) 
v12 .329 .360 .759 .732 .390 .442 .193 
(1.0) (1.2) (2.6) (2.3) (1.0) (1.1) (.4) 
v13 1.187 1.091 -2.061 -1.084 - 1.481 -.685 -.607 
(1.2) (1.2) (2.0) (1.0) (1.3) (.6) (.4) 
a, .078 .044 .065 .056 .031 .003 .000 
(2.6) (1.6) (2.6) (2.2) (1.0) (1.0) (.0) 
a2 . .. -.995 . . . -.606 . . . -.664 -.834 
(3.0) (1.7) (1.9) (2.0) 
a3 27.120 1.006 33.506 1.891 10.794 1.752 1.111 
(1.5) (.7) (2.2) (1.3) (.5) (1.2) (.6) 
a4 -59.172 -5.914 -75.091 -25.556 -43.323 - 7.547 1.144 
(2.2) (.2) (3.3) (1.0) (1.4) (.2) (.0) 
UI . . . . . . . . . . . . - 1.754 - 1.226 - 2.637 
(1.6) (1.2) (1.8) 
D1 . . . . . . .731 .413 .724 .431 .435 
(4.8) (2.8) (4.9) (3.0) (2.5) 
D2 . . . . . . .066 .091 .099 .112 -.063 
(1.1) (1.9) (1.6) (2.2) (1.0) 
D3 . . . . . . .093 .085 .138 .127 ... 
(1.4) (1.6) (2.0) (2.0) 
LD . .. .. ... . .. .. ... .121 
(.7) 
R2 .771 .872 .870 .904 .869 .908 .945 
N 60 60 60 60 60 60 40 
NOTE.-See app. D of Ehrenberg et al. (1982) for a description of data sources. Absolute value of t- 
statistics in parentheses. Variables as follows: 
vI = 3-year average quit rate; 
v2 = number of unions in industry; 
v3 = percentage of unionized workers in industry; 
v4 = 3-year average profit rate; 
v5 = percentage of workers covered by multiemployer agreements in industry; 
v6 = percentage of income due to wage earnings of union member; 
v7 = mean age of union members; 
v8 = percentage of union members married; 
v9 = percentage of union members white; 
viO = percentage of union members male; 
vII = percentage of union members residing in SMSAs; 
v12 = mean schooling level of union members; 
v13 = mean number of children in married union members' families; 
DI 1 if durable goods industry, 0 otherwise; 
D2 = 1 if 1981, 0 otherwise; 
D3 = 1 if 1978, 0 otherwise; 
UI = average UL net replacement rate = average weekly UL benefits/average weekly net (after tax) 
loss of income by laid-off unemployed workers in the industry; 
LD = lagged (3 years) dependent variable; 
al = estimate of elasticity of industry demand with respect to unanticipated inflation; 
a2 = estimate of serial correlation in effect of unanticipated inflation on industry demand; 
a3 = estimate of expected growth in demand; 
a4 = estimate of pure random variation in demand, productivity, and other input prices. 
238 Ehrenberg et al. 
Second, an increase in the elasticity of the demand curve with respect 
to unanticipated inflation (al) appears to be associated with an increase 
in the probability of an indexed contract, as suggested in Section III. 
Furthermore, the effect of an increase in the serial correlation of unan- 
ticipated inflation on the probability of an indexed contract can be shown, 
from equation (21), to be the same sign as the elasticity of the demand 
curve with respect to unanticipated inflation. If indexing is less than 
complete (E < 1), which is typical, ceteris paribus, this elasticity will tend 
Table 3 
Determinants of the Industry Layoff Rate (3-Year Average), 
by Two-Digit Manufacturing Industry: 1975, 1978, 1981 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
V1 .006 .006 .004 .004 .003 .001 .001 
(6.3) (7.5) (4.9) (5.7) (2.2) (.8) (.0) 
v2 .000 - .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
(.6) (.9) (1.5) (.9) (.6) (1.4) (1.6) 
v3 .004 .005 .003 .002 .004 .003 .003 
(3.1) (4.2) (2.6) (1.8) (3.0) (2.5) (1.9) 
v4 -.001 .000 -.000 -.000 -.000 -.000 -.000 
(.4) (.1) (1.6) (1.2) (1.2) (1.3) (1.2) 
v5 -.024 -.021 -.015 -.007 -.011 .004 .011 
(2.8) (2.8) (2.1) (1.0) (1.3) (.6) (1.1) 
v6 -.028 -.025 -.030 .026 -.017 .086 .127 
(.8) (.7) (.9) (.7) (.5) (2.4) (2.4) 
v7 -.000 -.001 -.000 -.000 -.001 -.000 .000 
(.5) (1.4) (.3) (.1) (1. 0) (.4) (.4) 
V8 -.002 .022 -.016 -.014 -.066 -.122 -.197 
( 0) (.5) (.5) (.4) (1.4) (2-9) (3.0) 
V9 .215 .268 .189 .171 .184 .065 .043 
(5.2) (4.7) (5.0) (3.1) (4.9) (1. 1) (.5) 
V10 -.021 -.038 -.014 -.037 -.025 -.049 -.063 
(1.7) (3.4) (1.2) (3.3) (1.8) (4.8) (4.0) 
V11 .042 .057 .023 .074 - .000 .035 .031 
(1.5) (2.0) (.8) (2.0) (.0) (1.0) (.7) 
v12 -.025 -.031 -.020 -.026 - .012 -.005 -.002 
(3.2) (3.6) (3.0) (3.1) (1.4) (.6) (.1) 
v13 .064 .083 .046 .091 .033 .062 .074 
(2.7) (3.3) (1.9) (3.0) (1.3) (2.3) (2.1) 
al -.001 -.002 -.001 -.001 -.000 .001 .001 
(1.9) (2.4) (2.1) (1.8) (.6) (.9) (1.2) 
a2 . . . -.029 . . . -.024 . . . -.020 -.018 
(3.0) (2.6) (2.5) (1.8) 
a3 -.076 -.107 -.686 -.085 -.202 -.075 -.085 
(1.8) (2.4) (2.0) (2.2) (.4) (2.2) (1.9) 
a4 1.106 .539 .967 .566 .291 - .739 - .805 
(1.7) (.6) (1.8) (.8) (.4) (1.0) (.7) 
UI . . . . . . . . . . . . .037 .089 .124 
(1.4) (3.7) (2.9) 
D 1 . . . . .. .003 -.004 .003 -.005 -.008 
(.9) (1.0) (9) (1.5) (1.8) 
D2 . . . . .. -.001 -.000 -.001 -.002 .005 
(.5) (.3) (.) (1-7) (2.1) 
D3 . . . . .. -.006 -.006 -.007 -.009 . . . 
LD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - .284 
(1.5) 
R2 .749 .788 .857 .866 .860 .903 .921 
N 60 60 60 60 60 60 40 
NOTE.-See table 2 for definition of variables. Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. 
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to be less than zero and this implies that an increase in the serial correlation 
parameter should decrease the probability of observing an indexed con- 
tract. In fact, we observe this result. 
Third, an increase in residual uncertainty appears to reduce the prob- 
ability of indexed contracts. This result is consistent with the theoretical 
result that degree of indexing declines with increased residual uncertainty, 
when the optimal degree of indexing is less than unity and employee 
relative risk aversion is greater than employer relative risk aversion. Where 
statistically significant, increased residual uncertainty also increases the 
industry layoff rate, a result consistent with a priori expectations. 
Fourth, an increase in the expected growth of demand reduces the 
industry layoff rate as might be expected and, where significant, appears 
to increase the probability of indexed contracts. One can show, from 
(21), that the effect of an increase in the expected growth of demand on 
wage indexing is of the same sign as (A* - A)(1 - S). Since it is likely 
that A*: > A (see Sec. IV), this result is consistent with employees' relative 
risk aversion's (S) being less than unity.30 Finally, where statistically sig- 
nificant, the greater the percentage of family income attributable to the 
wage earnings of the union member, the greater the probability of COLA 
coverage. In terms of the discussion in Section II, this suggests that other 
forms of family income tend to be fixed in real rather than nominal terms. 
Numerous associations between the other explanatory variables, COLA 
coverage, and the layoff rate are also found. The reader is referred to our 
longer paper for a discussion of these findings. While the results presented 
there and in this section cannot be described as totally unambiguous, 
they do generate some support for the relevance of the models that we 
developed in earlier sections. 
VIII. Empirical Analyses: Individual Contract Data 
Cost-of-living provisions vary widely across union contracts, on a 
number of dimensions. For example, they vary in the frequency of review. 
Some contracts call for quarterly reviews and adjustments of wages, some 
for semiannual reviews, and still others for annual ones. Some allow for 
a COLA increase in the initial year of the contract, while others do not. 
Other things equal, the earlier the first adjustment and the more frequent 
the reviews, the greater the "yield" of the COLA. That is, the more 
complete indexing will be. 
Cost-of-living adjustment provisions also vary in their generosity per 
review. Some specify minimum price increases before any cost-of-living 
wage increase is granted. Others specify maximum COLAs, or "caps." 
Still others specify bands of price increases (e.g., 5%-6%) for which no 
30 Some studies, however, find that relative risk aversion exceeds unity. See, 
e.g., Friend and Blume 1975; Farber 1978. 
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COLA wage increases will be granted. Clearly, such provisions affect 
the yield of a COLA. 
Increases are typically specified as a 1-cent increase in wages for each 
fractional point increase in the consumer price index. Among 102 major 
union contracts in 1979, this fraction varied between .3 and .6 (see 
AFL-CIO 1979). Larger fractions obviously represent less generous 
COLAs. The generosity of a COLA provision also depends on the level 
of earnings of the covered employees. Since COLAs typically are specified 
in absolute terms (so many cents per hour), the higher the earnings of 
employees, other things equal, the less generous a COLA will be. 
There are a number of strategies one might follow to ascertain the 
generosity of a COLA provision. First, one might estimate the ex ante 
degree of indexing by the ex post degree of indexing-the elasticity of 
wages with respect to inflation that actually occurred. This is the approach 
followed by Hendricks and Kahn (1983). 
Its weakness is that, given the complex way COLAs are formulated, 
this number will typically depend nonlinearly on both the actual level of 
inflation and the various COLA provisions. Since the elasticity of wages 
with respect to inflation typically varies with the level of inflation, it is 
unclear whether one should attempt to summarize the provisions of a 
COLA by this single number. Furthermore, such a number at best would 
be an average ex post elasticity; it would tell us nothing about the marginal 
effect of inflation on wages. Indeed, it is not difficult o think of circum- 
stances in which contract A shows a greater COLA increase than contract 
B, given the actual inflation rate that occurred, but where the marginal 
COLA increase for increments of inflation would be larger in B than in 
A because of a cap on the COLA increase in A. It is unclear in such a 
case which contract has the more generous COLA provision. 
A second approach is to argue that it is difficult o disentangle COLA 
increases from the portion of deferred noncontingent wage increases that 
are implicitly based on expectations of inflation. Indeed, if intracontract 
real-wage changes are generally small, one might treat them as zero and 
argue that the sum of the percentage deferred wage increases and the 
COLA increases that occurred ex post, divided by the ex post inflation 
rate, is a good measure of the ex ante elasticity of wages with respect to 
prices. 
The theoretical models we presented in Sections IV and V suggest that 
such an approach may be incorrect; it is possible to model both the 
determinants of COLA increases and of deferred increases. Moreover, a 
simple numerical example illustrates the empirical difficulties inherent in 
such an approach. Consider two contracts. Suppose that the first calls 
for a 5% deferred increase and no COLA increase, while the second calls 
for no deferred increase, but a 1 % COLA increase for each 1 % increase 
in prices. If the ex post increase in prices was 5%, the two would yield 
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equal percentage increases in wages and, if the ex ante increase in prices 
was also 5%, the two would also yield equal expected wage increases. 
However, the former would provide workers with no protection against 
unanticipated inflation, while the latter would provide them with com- 
plete protection. Since we and Card (1981) have argued that a major 
motivation for COLAs is their risk-sharing provisions, in particular the 
sharing of risks due to unanticipated inflation, it seems strange to argue 
that the two contracts offer equal COLA protection. 
A third approach, followed by Card (1982), is to argue that because 
of the interdependence between deferred and COLA increases, it makes 
little sense to focus on the overall ex post change in wages. Rather, Card 
measures the ex ante elasticity by the marginal elasticity of the wage 
escalator; the cents per point increase in the CPI that the escalator yields 
(while active) divided by the real contractual wage at the start of the 
contract. The weakness of this approach, of course, is that it ignores the 
presence of caps, nonlinearities, and so on. For example, two contracts 
may initially offer the same COLA payment per point increase in the 
CPI, but if one has a cap on the maximum size of the COLA payment 
and the other does not, one would not want to argue that both offer 
equal COLA protection. The weakness of Card's measure then lies in 
the restriction, "while active." 
The discussion above suggests that it may be inappropriate-indeed, 
nearly impossible-to summarize all of the information about the gen- 
erosity of a contract's COLA provisions in a single number. Hence, the 
strategy we followed in our longer paper was to use information on a 
whole vector of contract provisions that we obtained from individual 
manufacturing collective bargaining agreements covering more than 1,000 
workers that were on file with the Bureau of Labor Statistics in 1981. 
These provisions included whether there was a COLA provision, how 
frequent COLA reviews were, whether there was a review in the first 
year of the contract, the number of cents or percentage wage increase a 
worker would receive under a COLA for a given increase in the CPI, 
the presence of guaranteed minimum COLA increases and caps (or max- 
imum COLA increases), and the duration of the underlying contract. 
Each of these variables was related to a vector of explanatory variables 
suggested by our models that were similar to the vector used in Section 
VII, and the resulting equations were estimated using individual contract 
data and appropriate estimation methods (the dependent variables in- 
cluded dichotomous and truncated ones). 
Each of these variables provides information on the existence of a 
31 Our discussion of these two approaches should make it clear why we consider 
it equally inappropriate to use the expected COLA increase, valued at the expected 
level of inflation over the contract, as a measure of the generosity of a COLA; 
this measure tells us little about the response of wages to unanticipated inflation. 
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COLA, its generosity, or the duration of the underlying contract. A 
stringent test of our models, then, is to look at the coefficients of a given 
explanatory variable across equations and to see if a consistent pattern of 
results is present: that is, Does it appear that a given variable is influencing 
each of the outcomes in a way that is consistent with the underlying 
theoretical models? 
Details of the form of these equations and a table of results appear in 
Ehrenberg et al. (1982). The results can at best be described as mixed and 
do not provide strong support for the validity of our theoretical models. 
An explanation may lie in our method of testing. It may be unreasonable 
to expect that one can estimate the effect of an explanatory variable on 
10 different dimensions of a COLA provision and hope to observe a 
consistent pattern of coefficients across equations. After all, the theoret- 
ical models provide hypotheses about the elasticity of wages with respect 
to prices, not about timing of reviews, minimum increase, caps, and so 
forth. While we believe our criticisms of the approaches of previous 
investigators are valid, the approach we describe in this section obviously 
has its own problems. 
IX. Concluding Remarks 
This paper has presented a series of theoretical models that sought to 
ascertain the determinants of COLA provisions in union contracts, the 
generosity of these provisions when they exist, the magnitude of deferred 
wage increases that are not contingent on the price level, the duration of 
labor contracts, and the level of temporary layoffs. The factors highlighted 
were varied and encompassed characteristics of the firm's demand curve 
(including how it responds to unanticipated inflation), employee and 
employer risk aversion, characteristics of the bargaining relationship (in- 
cluding the costs of concluding negotiations), macroeconomic variables, 
and parameters of the unemployment insurance system. 
Two initial empirical tests of the hypotheses generated by the models 
were provided. The first test used data at the two-digit manufacturing 
industry level of aggregation and focused on the determinants of the 
fraction of workers covered by COLA provisions and on the industry 
layoff rate. This analysis, which made use of pooled cross-section time- 
series data, appeared to confirm a number of key implications of the 
models. The second test used data at the individual collective bargaining 
agreement level and focused on the determinants of COLA coverage, the 
characteristics of COLA agreements when they exist, and the duration 
of labor contracts. Unfortunately, the results here were much more mixed 
and did not provide strong support for the models. 
In spite of the mixed nature of these results, we believe our paper has 
demonstrated the usefulness of analyzing the determinants of these union 
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contract provisions in the context of risk-sharing models. Numerous 
extensions uggest themselves. At the empirical evel, it is clear that better 
measures of the ex ante degree of indexing must be devised. Neither the 
single parameter measures used by Card (1981) and Hendricks and Kahn 
(1983), based on ex ante marginal elasticities over an initial range and ex 
post wage increases, respectively, nor the multiple parameter measures 
used by us seem to be appropriate. At the very least, what is required is 
a two-parameter measure that contains information on both the expected 
COLA wage increase and the marginal change in the wage increase that 
would result from unanticipated inflation. 
We have also only begun to test the implications of the models. One 
productive line of testing would focus on the trade-off between COLA 
increases and deferred noncontingent wage increases. Much more work 
also needs to be done on the determinants of contract duration and on 
the effects of UI parameters (both replacement rates and experience rating) 
on the COLA-layoff trade-off. 
At the theoretical evel, an important unresolved issue is why COLA 
provisions typically take the form of "X cents per one point increase in 
the CPI" rather than "X% increase in wages for each percentage increase 
in the CPI." As is well known, the first form will fend to compress wage 
differentials within a firm, while the second will keep them constant. 
What is needed here are models of union decision-making processes that 
highlight how heterogeneity of union members and different voting 
schemes will lead to different types of contract provisions. Ultimately, 
such theoretical modeling should lead to empirical research on the de- 
terminants of the type of COLA provision adopted. 
Similarly, the minimum price increases that are required before COLA 
coverage starts in some contracts and the caps or maximum increases in 
others suggest that risk-sharing agreements often exist only over a subset 
of possible states of the world. It may be useful to try to model the 
conditions that lead to such restrictions and then to test the usefulness 
of such models empirically. 
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